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Abstract 
 
 
 
 
 
This study is analyzing the foreign relations of three major Iraqi communities, namely the 
Shia Arabs, the Kurds and Sunni Arabs. In order to properly characterize these 
communities’ external relations with neighboring countries, some of their foreign policy 
choices are examined at national and regional contexts. The issue of unresolved territorial 
disputes among the groups and ongoing security problems that are deeply affecting inter-
group relations and their ties with the U.S.-led coalition forces are also discussed. Under 
the light of neoclassical realist assumptions, the role of external (regional and 
international levels) and domestic (national level) constraints on foreign threat 
assessments made by Iraqi state’s foreign policy makers are investigated in order to 
explain Iraq’s certain foreign policy making processes within the context of those major 
groups’ external connections and strategic orientations at national, regional and 
international politics.  
 
Key words: Iraq’s major societal groups, neoclassical realism, foreign policy executive, 
Iraq’s neighboring countries, foreign threat assessment, national interests, international 
constraints. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
1.1 Research question and purpose 
 
Saddam Hussein was the sole decision maker of Iraqi state. Not only in foreign and 
security issues but also in domestic politics, his words were used to be recognized as 
rules and orders. Even though he was a Sunni Arab and he considered himself a Sunni 
Arab nationalist, his rule was an extreme sort of dictatorship. His strategic reliance on 
Iraq’s Sunni Arab minority does not mean that Sunni Arabs as a societal group was ruling 
the country. Instead, the ruling elite were composed of Ba’ath party top officials who 
were strictly loyal to Saddam’s personal orders. Most of those were from Sunni Arab 
tribes and/or Saddam’s relatives. Saddam as a sole decision-maker and ruler had created a 
decision making tradition in Iraqi state based on completely his own personal initiative, 
preferences and ideas. Therefore, once foreign and security policies and other critical 
national policies have been decided by him, then his Ba’ath party networks and state 
bureaucracies were beginning to carefully implement those orders and directives. 
However, today, foreign policy decision making processes are no longer composed of 
such kinds of simple and easy dictatorial procedures because Iraq’s major domestic 
societal groups have enough power at the national politics to interfere foreign policy 
making processes according to their respective group interests. Each of these major 
societal groups have more reasons to behave in rationalist/self-interested ways, when 
comes to configuration of foreign policy formulations by Iraq’s top state officials and 
foreign policy makers. First, it is because each group has enough political power at the 
state’s critical institutions. Second, each group has in varying degrees strategically 
important strong political and social connections with Iraq’s neighboring countries and/or 
some of power components in those countries. In other words, all three major societal 
groups do/can influence foreign and security political decision making systematic of new 
Iraq in certain degrees. This study is aiming to explain this complex decision making 
processes by examining the groups’ external relations with neighboring countries, the 
questions between these societal groups and their power position within Iraq’s new 
political system. The ongoing political and social conflicts among those groups will allow 
us to draw their conflicting foreign policy choices and interests in Iraq’s foreign politics.    
  
After fall of Saddam regime in 2003, Iraq’s political system has completely been altered. 
Saddam’s dictator rule was replaced by a new democratic political system based on the 
democratic political institutions, federalism and power-sharing among the country’s main 
ethnic and religious groups. The absolute rule of Sunni Arab minority has been replaced 
by the Shia and Kurdish alliance government via democratic elections. The new 
 5 
democratic constitution allowed the Kurds to establish their regional government in the 
predominantly Kurdish areas at the north of Iraq. The Shias who constitute about more 
than 60 per cent of Iraq’s population have won the majority of seats in the parliament. 
While the Shia and Kurdish coalition government is overwhelmingly dominated by Shias, 
the Kurds have also been given some very critical positions in strategic state institutions 
such the State Presidency and the Foreign Affairs Ministry. By today, the Sunni Arab 
minority is underrepresented because they had boycotted the previous elections. Since the 
end of 2008, the Iraqi government has been trying to include Sunni Arabs into political 
process to achieve national reconciliation among all Iraqi groups. The UN, the multi-
national coalition forces in Iraq, the EU and the U.S. have also been contributing to the 
efforts to speeding up national reconciliation process among Iraqi groups.  In fact these 
three major Iraqi groups are still far away from reaching a real national reconciliation at 
all levels and participate in all democratic institutions according to democratic principles, 
but establishment of democratic political institutions and approval of democratic 
constitution have guaranteed the removal of authoritarian state institutions and 
mechanisms. At today’s Iraq’s, it is those three major ethnic and religious communities 
running the political affairs. Each community has created its respective political coalition 
encompassing most of their political parties and groups to be able to compete with other 
communities for political power. Therefore, these communities have come to occupy a 
considerably great space of Iraq’s new political system, its institutions and mechanisms. 
 
The ongoing conflicts between some segments of Sunni and Shia communities may 
continue to exist in near future because of their historical rivalries and the intensity of 
violence has occurred between the two sides since the fall of Saddam regime. Recently 
new signs of disagreements are emerging between the Shia-dominated central 
government and the Kurdish regional administration too. The Kurds insist for 
referendums take place for the Kurdish cities remaining outside their autonomous region. 
The other reasons of this new conflict are that (a) the Kurds are also signing contracts 
with foreign companies to sell their oil products; and (b) the Kurdish regional 
government is developing direct diplomatic relations with foreign countries. All these 
problems among the Iraqi groups make them to pursue different objectives and strategies 
in their relations with foreign powers in the Middle East and in the World. Their foreign 
policy choices, therefore, differ from each other and contain conflicting features. Since 
each of these groups enjoys some power bases within the state institutions and domestic 
politics, they are able influence the Iraq’s foreign policy decision makers in certain 
extent. Because of their historically rooted ethnic and religious ties with their kin-groups 
residing in the neighboring countries, these major social groups (except the Kurds) have 
naturally gone into strategic political relations with the ruling communities of those 
neighboring countries. In the case of the Kurds, engagement and relations with those 
countries have also been politically quite strategic and security-related, but the relations 
have never been in friendly manner because the basic intention of Turkey, Syria and Iran 
is to impede the increasing Kurdish autonomy and self-rule in Iraq. 
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By considering those three major Iraq’s societal groups’ power positions within the state 
structures and their foreign relations and foreign policy choices this research paper is 
going to try to explain  the basic characteristics of these three groups’ external relations 
and their foreign policy choices. My examination is basically based on two empirical 
observations: (1) Current power-sharing among the major communities in Iraqi politics, 
and (2) those major groups’ strategic and political relations with the neighboring 
countries in the region. By focusing on the existing relations between Iraq’s major 
societal groups and the neighboring countries, my paper will focus on answering this 
research question: In spite of Iraq’s main societal groups’ divergent interests and 
conflicting behaviors/actions in their external relations and their contradictory responses 
to regional and international constraints, Why Iraq’s top state officials (foreign policy 
makers), who are at the same time the leaders of those domestic groups, have designed 
and advocated foreign policy options maintaining Iraq’s national and security interests 
instead of pursuing their narrow group interests in foreign politics? Answering this 
question will allow us to see to what extent to Iraq’s three major societal groups (the Shia 
Arabs, the Kurds and Sunni Arabs)  can influence and limit the Iraqi State’s foreign 
policy makers’ through their relatively autonomous behaviors and actions inside and 
outside country. Therefore, there are two main objectives of this paper. First, it is aiming 
to explain some main characteristics of major three Iraqi groups’ foreign relations and 
their foreign policy choices, and thus depicting the roles of those main societal groups in 
Iraq’s foreign policy conduct. It is because, although grand ethnic and religious lines are 
dividing the country’s population, new federal Iraqi state (through its statesmen) as a new 
parliamentarian and democratic republic is able to speak with a single voice in country’s 
foreign political affairs. The other purpose of this paper is to try to explain Iraq’s 
currently developing some foreign policy actions through neoclassical realist approach. 
In another word, here the objective is to show how systemic, regional and domestic 
variables/factors all at the same time can shape the country’s foreign policies/behaviors 
via Iraqi State top state officials, in spite of Iraq’s main societal groups’ divergent 
interests and behaviors in their external relations and conflicting responses to regional 
and international constraints. 
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2. Method and Material 
 
 
 
 
 
The examination in this study is basically built on the foreign relations of the three main 
Iraqi ethnic groups’ dominant political parties and movements. This is a case study based 
qualitative methods. The behaviors of these political parties in question are going to be 
analyzed in relation to their positioning in Iraqi politics and their respective group 
interests in comparison to their rivals at national politics. The level of analysis is, 
therefore, is based on the major political components representing those three groups, the 
Sunni Arabs, the Kurds and the Shia Arabs, in Iraq’s national politics. The illegal 
affiliates/wings (armed groups) of these major legitimate political forces are going to be 
included in the analysis due to the substantial importance of security problem prevalent in 
the country and Middle East politics. We also keep in mind that each of these three 
groups is composed of multiple political parties and then united around their respective 
group coalitions. In reality, those sub-groups of those three major communities do not act 
independently of their respective communities’ basic political intentions. Some other 
small and marginal communities do also exist both outside those three major groups. 
However they are not going to be included in the analysis due to their very limited 
presence and power at national politics other ethnic and religious minorities in Iraq such 
as Assyrians, Mendaeans, Iraqi Turkmen and Armenians.  
 
In line with neoclassical assumptions, my paper will try to explain the process in which 
the external structural pressures and domestic incentives all together determine the 
foreign policy decisions taken by Iraq’s top state officials. In this study, constraints and 
pressure stemming from domestic societal groups and the structure of international and 
regional politics/system should be regarded as independent variables. ‘For neoclassical 
realists, the state [top official decision makers] is an intervening variable between the 
international system and foreign policy’ (Lobell 2009:44). Therefore, foreign policy 
option assessments by Iraq’s top officials should be considered as intervening variables 
in this case. Iraq’s finalized foreign policy decisions, on the other hand, should be 
regarded as dependent (outcome and/or output) variables. Domestic political incentives 
are the aims and actions of major ethnic/religious groups in foreign relations and their 
power-positions in Iraq’s national politics. The dominant strategies resulted from the 
foreign policy decisions/behaviors of Iraqi top state officials is going to be revealed by 
centering on Iraq’s internal political dynamics (Domestic political incentives and major 
Iraqi groups’ aims/motivations) and the pressures/constraints exerted on Iraq by 
international (systemic) and regional (sub-systemic) politics.  
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Due to the characteristics of this theoretical perspective, by which the research question is 
going to be explained, the analysis will be carried out at two levels: (1) Iraqi state (unit)-
level analysis and (2) inter-state level (international and regional level). At first, main 
Iraqi groups’ power positions in domestic politics and their strategically dynamic 
political and social ties is going to be detailed. Iraq’s new constitution specifies the 
autonomy enjoyed by the groups at national level. Therefore the constitution is one of the 
key sources. I will also benefit from relevant reports and articles published by multiple 
American think-tanks, academic journals and news reports. The interactions between the 
major Iraqi groups and their relations with the neighboring countries, regional forces and 
international powers will be examined within the context of Iraq’s foreign policy actions 
at regional level. By doing so, we aim to see Iraq’s societal actors’ influence over the 
foreign policy choices. At inter-state level analysis, the pressures from regional and 
international levels on Iraqi major domestic forces and the consequences of those 
constraints on the Iraqi foreign policy makers are going to be examined.  
 
This study is limited in terms of time and covering the period 2004 - mid-2009. It is 
reasonable to do so because the first interim Iraqi government was established in 2004 
after the fall of Saddam regime by the U.S.-led coalition forces in 2003. Therefore, given 
the structural political changes, the year 2004 is of great importance for Iraqi politics. The 
main Iraq’s societal (ethnic and religious) groups began to establish themselves 
organizationally within the state’s new political and bureaucratic institutions when the 
transfer of political power from the multinational coalition forces to the Iraqis started out 
in 2004.   
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3. Theoretical Framework 
 
 
 
 
 
An emerging realist approach to international relations and foreign policy analysis is 
going to be used in this paper to explain the problematic and characterize the main 
features of external relations and foreign policy choices of the three main Iraqi societal 
groups, namely the Kurds, Sunni Arabs and Shias. This new realist school of theories is 
neoclassical realism. I will basically try to order and problematise the issues and 
questions in this paper according to neoclassical realist assumptions developed by 
Taliaferro, Lobell and Ripsman (2009). Some realist assumptions of Samuel P. 
Huntington’s clash of civilizations thesis are also going to be employed in the analysis 
instrumentally in order to properly characterize the role of domestic societal groups in 
shaping Iraq’s foreign politics. Employing neoclassical realist school of foreign policy 
analysis will allow us to make a more comprehensive examination of the complex foreign 
policy conduct of the new federal and democratic Iraq at today. Neoclassical realist view 
is not aiming to develop a comprehensive universal theory of international relations, 
instead ‘[f]or them the question is: which realist school (if any) is most useful for 
analyzing issues of foreign policy at a given place and time? To some extent, the choice 
of theory is contextual issue’ (Wohlforth 2008: 35). Neoclassical realism is a theory of 
foreign policy study as Lobell (2009) rightly states. Therefore, we have many reasons to 
employ this realist foreign policy theory to explain Iraq’s main domestic groups’ foreign 
policy tendencies and the constraints these groups face from inside and outside.  
 
Huntington’s assumptions, on the other hand, is going to be employed to characterize the 
Iraq’s main societal groups as autonomous cultural and political entities within Iraq’s 
new political system. As a version of classical realism, Huntington’s thesis of clash of 
civilizations is primarily concerned with the sources and uses of cultural-religious-
civilizational power and conflicts in international relations. For this reason, the leading 
classical realist theorists have put great emphasis on ‘power distributions amongst states, 
as well as the character of states and their relation to domestic society’ (Taliaferro 
2009:16). When we look at the power-sharing mechanisms present in Iraq’s political and 
its new legal system, constitutional acts and governmental practices, one can easily see 
the fact that the political power are shared between these three main Iraqi social and 
political groups. Some local and regional level cases, such as Kirkuk city issue and the 
issue of Kurdish conflict in Turkey and its impacts on the triangle relations between the 
Kurdish regional government, Iraq’s central government and Turkish state is also going 
to be examined to reveal the severe competition over political and economic resources 
among the major Iraqi groups and their relations with Iran, Syria and Turkey. By doing 
so, I aim to make the analysis more practical and touch upon relevant facts and factors. 
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Pointing to those small scale regional questions will, in great extent, help us to see the 
groups’ attitudes and behaviors in the country’s foreign politics and their alignment with 
foreign powers. The groups’ external ties with foreign powers within the context of those 
issues will allow us to characterize their relations with regional and international actors 
more clearly because Iran and the Sunni Arab countries did, more or less, involve in these 
regional issues by advocating the interests of their kin groups in Iraq. However more 
importantly, classical realism’s assumptions explaining foreign policy decision are of 
great importance for our analysis.  
 
Not Iraqi groups’ foreign ties and their individual group interests but the national 
interests do determine the foreign policy decisions. However we should point to the fact 
that the foreign policy decisions by Iraqi leadership (Iraqi government which are 
composed of the leaders of those major groups) were not only product of those 
politicians’ rational pursuit of Iraq’s national interests against outside powers. The 
constraints and pressure exerted on Iraqi state by international (systemic) and regional 
(sub-systemic) political competition amongst states has also influenced the final decisions 
of Iraq’s foreign policy makers. As neoclassical realists rightly argue, not only national 
state-level analysis and factors but also interstate-level analysis and variables need to 
taken into account in order to understand how foreign policy decisions are taken by top 
official politicians in practice. According to neorealism, international system does not 
only refer to the interaction among states, instead it is a sort of material structure that 
influence and determine the foreign policy behaviors and decisions of individual states 
partly (Viotti and Kauppi 1999:84).  
 
In order to undertake a deep analysis of the relations between the state’s political forces 
and society, Samuel P. Huntington’s concept of kin-rallying-country and his arguments 
about the divisions within Islamic are going to be used in this thesis. Since Iraq’s 
population and politics is represented by three main social-political forces whose 
identities are essentially constructed on ethnic and religious differences, the relations of 
major three Iraqi groups can be examined according to Huntington’s conceptualization of 
the relations between ethnic and religious groups and/or among them and other 
neighboring states with similar and different backgrounds. Samuel P. Huntington argues 
that religious and cultural differences will be a new source of conflict and of political 
activitism at international politics. His arguments are helpful in defining the groups’ 
political and social ties at regional level. It is commonly acknowledged that the relations 
between Iraqi groups and their neighboring countries are essentially based on their 
common religious and ethnic backgrounds, histories and identities. Huntington’s 
theoretical assumptions will allow us to see the role of religious and cultural identities 
behind the conflictual relations between the Iraqi groups, and between them and their 
neighboring countries. This perspective also makes possible for us to define these groups 
not only as political actors at national politics but also as social and cultural entities 
pursuing relations beyond the borders of Iraq.  
 
 11
Islamic world is separated into contending powers. Each of these power-centers is trying 
to draw advantages from Muslim identification with the whole Muslim world in order to 
contribute to the progress of Islamic cohesion under its leadership (Huntington 
1996:176). Therefore, in the Middle East region, the major source of competition 
between the Muslim countries has been the sectarian divide between the Shia Islam and 
Sunni Islam. It is likely to argue that the Shia Islam today is represented by a powerful 
core state, Iran. However the Sunni Muslim world is still divided, and within Sunni 
countries there is no core state appears to lead them at international level. Yet, because of 
the competition at regional level and the severe ongoing conflict and clashes between the 
Sunni and Shia groups in Iraq following the regime change in 2003, there has been some 
Sunni states supporting covertly or sometimes openly the Sunni Arab groups in Iraq. 
Putting in Huntington’s (1996) terminology, a “fault line war” within Islamic civilization 
has come about in Iraq following the fall of Saddam’s Ba’athist rule and the regime 
change. Huntington’s (ibid) concept the “kin-country rallying” deserve more intention 
here. It is because while the Shia Iraqis have been backed by Iran, the Sunni Iraqi Arabs 
(both secular and radical groups) have been advocated by Sunni Arab countries though at 
lesser extent. These concepts not only help us to define these major groups in terms of 
their social characteristics, but they will also allow us to characterize their external ties 
with external powers over the common identities they share with them. It should be noted 
that, in this study the Huntington’s assumptions are instrumentally employed in order to 
characterize the major Iraqi societal groups’ ethnic and religious orientations and their 
culturally backed political ties with their kin groups and states properly within the 
boundaries of realist tradition. These assumptions do not contradict with neoclassical 
arguments; instead they in a way help us to underline the essential characteristics of 
Iraq’s major domestic groups and their power potentials at national and regional contexts. 
This refers to a realist assumption that neoclassical realists and classical realist share.  
 
 
3.1 Neoclassical Realism and Iraq’s foreign policy conduct  
 
Neorealists basically claim that ‘systemic and sub-systemic structural forces shape the 
broad parameters of a state’s behaviour in the international arena’ (Sterling-Folker 1997 
in Lobell 2009). ‘These external constraints and opportunities for action will create 
incentives and disincentives, but they alone cannot account for a state’s particular foreign 
policy’ (Lobell 2009:62-63). However, as neoclassical realist Lobell (2009:63) rightly 
argues, internal problems and domestic forces with divergent interests can prevent a State 
from acting in the rational ways in foreign politics. According to neoclassical realism, 
‘both systemic and sub-systemic structural and unit-level forces influence the behavior of 
state leaders’ (Lobell 2009:64). It is because in neoclassical realist view, ‘systemic and 
sub-systemic pressures are translated through intervening variables at the unit-level to 
explain a particular state’s foreign policy or a specific historical event’ (Lobell 2009:73).  
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Neoclassical realists argue that ‘the state exists as a potentially autonomous actor that is 
distinct from any [domestic] societal group’ (Ripsman 2009:280). In the foreign policy 
realm, the state consists of the foreign policy executive [(FPE)], principally the head of 
government and key ministers and officials charged with the conduct of foreign policy… 
[And] although the members of the foreign policy executive may be drawn from a 
particular class or societal coalition, their interests and preferences reflect a distinct 
raison d'état focus’ (Ripsman 2009:280-81). We should also note that neoclassical 
realists do consider diplomats, intelligence officers and policy makers as a component of 
FPEs, in addition to those top state officials serving in critical governmental and 
bureaucratic institutions. The FPE concentrate outward on the inter-states competition at 
international and regional levels, and inwards on the competition between major domestic 
societal groups at national level (Lobell 2009:46). FPE as a unified central decision 
maker assess foreign threats to national security and interests at the systemic, sub-
systemic and domestic levels when formulating the state’s foreign policy decisions (ibid).  
 
Leaders/elites of domestic societal groups may press and force FPE to decide and behave 
not in the nation’s grand strategic interest but favoring their specific group interests 
(Lobell: 2009:61). Such sort of efforts by societal groups’ leaders may result in certain 
policy outcomes if societal groups are very powerful at national politics and in state’s 
critical political institutions as in the countries such as Iraq. We also should note that state 
leaders (FPE) may not be always unified in their assessment of threat because they may 
have very strong ties with major domestic societal groups (Lobell: 2009:62). ‘Also it is 
important to note that many FPEs are erstwhile societal elites and will likely to return 
their former or similar positions’ (ibid).  
 
Lobell (2009:64) argues that State leaders (FPE) are unconstrained or constrained 
minimally, if (1) at international and regional levels, the FPE identifies a certain power 
component of the foreign state as a threat to the national interests, and if (2) at domestic 
level, all leaders of societal groups agree on branding a foreign state as threat to their 
interests. But, when forces on the international (systemic), regional (sub-systemic) and 
national (domestic) levels do not converge, the FPE is constrained in its foreign threat 
assessments and consequently in foreign policy making according to the national 
interests. For example, the FPE do identify a component of power of the foreign state as a 
threat to their national interests and security but the FPE’s societal supporters do not 
identify the element as a threat to their narrow/local interests. In this case if the 
leaders/elites of domestic societal groups have strong ties to the FPE, the outcome will be 
a delayed, sluggish or insufficient threat assessment and foreign policy decisions by FPE, 
Lobell (2009:66-67) argues.  
 
Jack S. Levy of Rutgers University rightly says that neoclassical perspective focuses on 
“how internal state structures filter external threats and opportunities, and how state 
leaders evaluate threats, formulate strategies, and mobilize societal resources to support 
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those strategies.” 1 Despite the paradoxes they are facing due to their divergent group 
interests, the major three Iraqi political forces have not allied with foreign states 
threatening Iraq’s integrity. And when comes to choosing between the country’s common 
national interests/security or collaborating their respective kin-countries at the expense of 
Iraq’s national interests in foreign politics, they have modified the foreign policy choices 
and actions conflicting with the country’s grand national security interests. It is basically 
because the groups’ leaders (and their other high-rank officials) were the same state’s top 
officials who finalize these foreign policy decisions at governmental levels in the end. 
Assessment of regional and international constraints on Iraqi foreign politcs by those 
Iraqi foreign-policy makers does constitute another important part of our analysis of 
foreign policy decision making process. But without considering the major domestic 
societal groups’ foreign policy choices and their relations with foreign countries, we may 
not be able to explain the exact factors that forced those three major Iraqi societal groups 
to act in line of the country’s top state foreign policy makers/officials on the behalf of the 
country’s national interests in foreign politics. Therefore in order to explain the state’s 
finalized foreign policy choices and actions properly, it seems necessary to take carefully 
into account the pressure of domestic societal groups on FPE and foreign policy making 
processes in addition to systemic and sub-systemic constraints, as neoclassical realists do 
claim so. 
 
Like classical realists, neoclassical realists are concerned with the state and its relation 
with society but they additionally take into account the neorealist assumption that 
international system shapes and restricts the states’ foreign policy options (Taliaferro 
2009:19).  The following chapter is concentrating on a set of political, cultural and 
economical factors that have been shaping Iraq’s major communities’ (Sunni Arabs, 
Shias, and Kurds) foreign relations with Iraq’s neighboring countries and their foreign 
policy choices related to some certain selected issues. In other words, the societal groups’ 
political and strategic orientations and the inter-community relations within the context of 
Iraqi politics will be analyzed in line with neoclassical realist assumptions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                  
1In his review on the book ‘Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy’ by Steven E. Lobell (ed),  
http://cambridge.org/us/catalogue/catalogue.asp?isbn=0521517052  
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4. The Major Iraqi Communities and their 
External Relations 
 
 
 
 
When we look at writings of neoclassical realists such as those who are referred to in this 
study, they pay great attention to the domestic societal groups. One may need to put 
much more emphasis on domestic societal groups, if the case of study is of the foreign 
policy analysis of a country whose population is divided through sharp religious and 
ethnic lines organizationally such as Iraq.  In such countries, major societal groups can 
influence the country’s foreign and security policies decision makers via their domestic 
power at national level, their external relations with foreign countries and their alignment 
with (or opposition to) regional and international powers.  This chapter is aiming to 
depict Iraq’s major societal groups’ above-mentioned characteristic in line with 
neoclassical realist assumptions and some of Samuel P. Huntington’s realist arguments. 
Examining Kirkuk issue will also help us to indicate the implications of inter-groups’ 
relations (conflicts) at national level for domestic, regional and international forces. 
 
 
4.1 The Shias  
 
Shias today constitute around 60 percent of Iraq’s whole population, whereas Sunnis 
make up 37 percent, divided between ethnic Arabs and Kurds (Gritten 2006). With 
national elections in 2005, a coalition of Shia political groups (‘United Iraq Alliance’) 
won 140 out of 275 seats in the Iraqi parliament. Today together with two major Kurdish 
parties, the Iraqi government is run by a Shia and Kurdish coalition. Current Iraqi prime 
minister (Nuri al-Maliki) is also the leader of Islamic Dawa Party, the second largest Shia 
group within the ruling Shia alliance in Iraq. The biggest Shia party within Shia United 
Iraq Alliance is the ‘Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq’ (SCIRI) led by 
Abdul-Aziz al-Hakim. The movement of Muqtada al-Sadr (a Shia cleric leader) and some 
other small Shia secular groups are also included in this alliance. Like Islamic Dawa 
Party and Sadr movement, the SCIRI is also known as an Iranian-backed movement, 
which have opposed to Saddam regime from early1980s (Gleave 2007:7). SCRI and 
Dawa party came back to Iraq and they went into cooperation with the U.S.-led Iraqi 
transitional government following to the fall of Saddam regime (ibid). Internal divisions 
within SCRI and Islamic Dawa party left the Sadr movement as the largest 
parliamentarian group (having around 30 MPs) within the Shia alliance today. However, 
the Shia alliance (and consequently the government) is led by Nuri al-Maliki’s Dawa 
party. When comparing to SCRI and Sadr’s movement, Islamic Dawa party tends to be 
more secular and it did not hesitate to form alliances with moderate Shia parties and some 
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secular Sunni movements at local and national levels despite its on-going relations with 
Iranian regime. 
 
There have been two influential Shia armed militia groups whose violent campaigns 
against the coalition and Iraq’s new security forces have been secretly advocated by Iran. 
The most powerful of these two is the Mahdi Army of Muqtada al-Sadr ‘whose brand of 
Shia nationalism, opposition to the coalition forces and hostility toward the powerful 
established Shia political parties in Iraq has proved popular among disenfranchised, poor 
Shias’ (BBC, 15 Aug 2006). Sadr’s Mahdi Army is the first Shia group began fighting 
against the U.S.-led coalition forces after the invasion. When Sunni insurgents and al-
Qaeda groups have more and more intensified their attacks on Shia areas, ‘the Mahdi 
Army has become one of the major armed forces on the ground in Baghdad, controlling - 
and protecting - predominantly Shia areas’ (ibid). Both Shia militias and Sunni insurgents 
have carried out sectarian killings against each other since the beginning of war in 2003 
(ibid). The other Shia militia group is the ‘Badr Organization’, which has been known as 
the armed branch of the SCIRI, has very strong Iranian connections (ibid). Tahran regime 
has the power to influence Iraqi Shias because most of Shia societal/political leaders have 
spent years in exile in Iran (Beehner 2006). The U.S. intelligence service claims that Iraqi 
Shia extremists are being trained in several locations inside Iran.2  
 
Muqtada al-Sadr backed ‘Maliki of the Dawa Party, who became as prime minister in 
April 2006.’ However, in the summer of 2008, Sadr broke with Maliki over his refusal to 
set a timetable for American withdrawal (New York Times, 09 June 2008). And so in 
March of 2008, Iraqi security forces began to launch military operations against Mahdi 
Army in Basra. Not surprisingly, it was Iranians who negotiated a ceasefire and brought 
an end to the clashes between two Shia groups (ibid). Mahdi army, known with its 
extreme anti-U.S. and anti-Maliki government stance, have clashed with Iraqi and the 
U.S. security forces that spread many towns of Basra province and Sadr city of Baghdad 
in March of 2008 (The Washington Post, 28 March 2008). For Iranians, intra-Shia in Iraq 
conflicts is not a desirable thing which is likely to weaken their influence on Iraqi 
politics. When the two Shia militias (Sadr’s Mahdi Army and SCIRI’s Badr 
Organization) started fighting each other in Baghdad in 2007, Iranian regime forced 
successfully the warring parties for a truce to keep the unity among Iraqi Shias (The 
Economist, 16 Feb 2008). This shows that Shia societal groups’ relations with Iran is 
quite strongly established both at socio-cultural and organizational levels. Iran’s 
influence on the Shia community in general can be highly determinative. By keeping 
intra-Shia relations secure and well, Iran is aiming to balance American pressure on itself 
and keep Shias dominant in Iraqi political system to strengthen its positioning at regional 
level against the powers such as Israel and Saudi Arabia and the U.S. forces in Iraq. Iraqi 
                                                  
2 Iraq's Shia extremists 'trained in Iran by Hizbollah, in Telegraph.co.uk (15 Aug 2008) 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iran/2565758/Iraqs-Shia-extremists-trained-in-
Iran-by-Hizbollah.html  
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Shias’ organizations and their societal elites close ties to Iran allows Tahran regime to 
deepen its relations with Shia societies across Iraq. 
 
Local elections of January of 2009 have brought about substantial consequences for Iraqi 
national politics. While Maliki of Dawa party focused much more on Iraqi nationalism 
and centralization, ISCI strongly emphasized sectarist Shiaism and federalism (Visser 
2009). Maliki emerged as a winner from the local elections which clearly indicates the 
victory of centralists over federalists (ibid). The election results also showed that the Shia 
parties, which have been campaigning for a federal region in Basra (a predominantly 
southern province) similar to Kurdish federal region, didn’t do well, either.3 Since 2008, 
Maliki’s party has minimized its Shia sectarian position, pressing the illegal Shia armed-
militias in Baghdad and Basra, normalizing relations with Sunni Arabs in parliament and 
giving up its sectarist discourses during their provincial election campaigns (PNA, 31 
May 2009). ISCI’s short-term leadership within Shia alliance by Abdul-Aziz al-Hakim 
could not have sustained itself as they wished, basically because of the extreme Shia 
ideology they follow. Dawa party is doing much better because of its openness to other 
secular Shia and Sunni political groups of which later on joined the Shia alliance (United 
Iraq Alliance). In January 2009, while Maliki’s party emerged as the biggest winner from 
the local elections, ISCI was the biggest loser. The success and leadership of Maliki’s 
Dawa party within Shia alliance indicates that Iraqi Shias can broaden and deepen their 
political dominance in Iraqi politics when they act independenly of Iran’s Shiaism and its 
ideological influence. More ideological independence the leading Shia parties enjoy, 
more they get closer to other Iraqi social and political groups. However, it is unlikely to 
argue that Iraqi Shia sociatal leaders will lessen their close relations with Iran in near 
future. It is important note that the major Shia groups follow different ideological and 
political lines, but all have strong links to Tahran regime. For instance, while ISCI and 
some segments of Shia community are campaigning for a federal Shia region in Iraq’s 
southern Basra province, Sadr movement and Islamic Dawa party are not sympathetic to 
this idea, fearing that an automonus region in the South may weaken Shias’ political 
domination at national level. 
 
Shia societal leaders’ foreign relations are charaterized by their strong connections with 
Iran. Unlike the Kurds, the Shias want the U.S. forces withdraw from Iraq as soon as 
possible. Withdrawal of the U.S.-led colaition forces will make it easer for Shias groups 
to counter the Kurds’ territorial demands and weaken their power position in Bagdad. 
Instead of pursuing seperatist and clear anti-American strategies, the Shia societal leaders 
have basically chosen to dominate Iraq’s state institutions via their their huge electoral 
power across the country. Their foreign policy choices toward Syria and Turkey are 
characterized by their worsening partnership with Iraqi Kurdish leadership and their 
highly conflictual and tentious relations with Sunni Arabs. 
                                                  
3 See, ‘Basra federalism campaign failing’ at Middle East Times, 19 January 2009  
http://www.metimes.com/Security/2009/01/19/basra_federalism_campaign_failing/dd23/  
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4.2 The Iraqi Kurds 
 
Iraqi Kurds under the leadership of two major Kurdish parties (KDP and PUK) have been 
running their own political, economic and social affairs since the first Gulf War in 1991, 
through their own regional government, assembly and security forces. Today, new federal 
Iraq is composed of eighteen governorates and one region, Kurdish federal region. The 
article 116 of Iraqi constitution states that “the region shall adopt a constitution that 
defines the structure of the regional government, its authorities and the mechanisms of 
exercising these authorities provided that it does not contradict with this Constitution” 
(Iraq’s new Constitution, 16 October 2005). For this reason, the Kurdish region does 
enjoy a considerable degree of political and economical autonomy. The region owns a 
regional democratic parliament and a dynamic economy which is doing much better than 
the rest of country due to its highly improved political and economical stability and order 
(Wahab 2008). Today ‘the region is hosting thousands of the U.S. soldiers, diplomatic 
missions, multinational corporations and business-people (Zunes 2007). The central 
government in Baghdad is led by a coalition made of major Shia and Kurdish political 
parties. As of today, Iraq’s prime minister is a Shia, Nuri-al Maliki of Dawa party but the 
president of Iraq is a prominent Kurdish leader, Jalal Talabani. In the Iraqi cabinet, 
Foreign Affairs Ministry is also headed by a Kurdish figure, Hoshyar Zabari from KDP. 
One of the two Iraq’s Deputy Prime Ministers is also a Kurdish political figure, Barham 
Salih, from PUK. Iraqi military commander-in-chief is also a Kurdish figure from KDP. 
The rest of cabinet is predominantly occupied by the leader cadres of Shia alliance. 
 
The Kurds owe all these achievements to their persistent struggle against Saddam regime 
and to their close cooperation with the U.S. and the West since last three decades. Unlike 
Shia and Sunnis, the Kurds as a stateless nation, do not have any kin-country o which 
they can rely. Turkey does not still recognize the Kurdish regional administration in 
official terms. Turkey and Iran actually have serious problems with their own Kurds who 
have been struggling against authoritarian Turkish and Persian regimes through 
democratic means and guerrilla warfare for Kurdish autonomy. Recently, on 2nd of May 
in 2009, Iranian army shelled again border regions of Iraqi Kurdistan including villages 
through military helicopters.4 However the fact that Iran is not alone in its practice 
because Turkish airstrikes and shelling on the border regions inside Iraqi Kurdistan have 
intensified since 2007.5 Both Turkey and Iran argue that their military operations in 
border regions of Iraqi Kurdistan are aiming to target Kurdish guerillas (Kurdistan 
Workers’ Party, known as PKK) but in fact they are also bombing Kurdish civilian 
settlements inside Iraqi Kurdistan. Last year, the chief of Turkey’s army have publicly 
declared that ‘Turkey and Iran are conducting joint military operations’ along border 
                                                  
4 Source: Reuters, ‘Iran shells Iraqi Kurdistan village’ in Alertnet (04 May 2009) 
http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L4126550.htm  
5 Source: The New York Times, ‘Turkey Says Its Raids in Iraq Killed 150 Rebels’ (26 Dec 2007) 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/26/world/europe/26turkey.html  
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regions of Iraqi Kurdistan against Kurdish guerillas (CNN 05 June 2008). Sudden 
withdrawal of American forces from Iraq may encourage Turkish and Persian agression 
towards Iraqi Kurdistan. Turkey, which is known a Cold-War ally of the U.S. and a 
member of NATO, have been promised by the Bush administration to support Turkey in 
its fight against Kurdish gueraillas (BBC News, 02 Nov 2007). The U.S. officials have 
been apparently forcing the Kurdish government to cooperate with Turkey against their 
co-ethnics. Up to now, The Iraqi Kurds avoided helping Tukish forces against PKK in 
military ways; instead they call Americans and Turkish government repeatedly to look 
for peaceful and political solutions to end the Kurdish conflict in Turkey. Meanwhile the 
U.S. has started to share real-time intelligence with Turkish army to aid in their efforts to 
repress PKK in Turkey-Iraq border regions in 2007.6 Pentagon of the U.S. declared that 
they have been providing Turkish army with real-time intelligence that has helped the 
Turkish military target a series of attacks against PKK fighters holed up in border regions 
of Kurdistan, including large number of airstrikes since 2007.7 Considering the 
coordinated attacks by Iranian-Turkish armies on the Iraqi Kurdish villages on border 
regions, it shows that the Iraqi Kurds’ relations with their neighboring countries are 
characterized by tension and mistrust. When comparing with Syria and Turkey, Iran is 
much open to the Kurds, but the U.S. presence and its unresolved Kurdish problem 
obstruct the relations between Iran and Kurdistan region of Iraq to be developed properly.  
 
The U.S officials are always referring to the political and economic achievements made 
in Kurdish region in their reports, and they say that Kurdistan’s flourishing economy is 
offering great business opportunities (Rogers 2007). For instance, the U.S. Department of 
Commerce’s Iraq Investment and Reconstruction Task Force has recommended Kurdish 
region as the regional gateway for doing-businesses and investing in the country (KRG 
22 February 2006). It is widely acknowledged that the commercial ties between the 
Kurdistan region and Turkey have prevented Turkish aggression from attacking the Iraqi 
Kurds directly since the official establishment of Iraqi Kurdistan regional administration 
via new Iraqi constitution. The autonomous Kurdish Regional Government started selling 
crude-oil to the foreign markets for the first time after finalizing an agreement with the 
Maliki government in Baghdad in May of 2009. The agreement was reached on the 
condition that the revenue will be divided by the central Iraqi Oil Ministry amongst the 
country’s provinces and regions, including Kurdish autonomous region (Williams 2009). 
Although Iraqi Oil Ministry has allowed the oil exports, Maliki government is still 
refusing to recognize the several oil contracts that have been previously signed between 
the Kurdish government and the foreign oil-corporations (ibid).  
 
                                                  
6 Source: The New York Times, ‘U.S. Sharing Intelligence With Turkey’ (15 Nov 2007) 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/15/world/europe/15turkey.html  
7 ‘U.S. Helps Turkey Hit Rebel Kurds In Iraq: Intelligence Role Could Complicate Diplomacy’ (by Ann 
Scott Tyson and Robin Wright in 18 December 2007), The Washington Post 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/12/17/AR2007121702150.html   
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As one of Iraq’s major domestic groups, the Kurdish community and its political 
leadership have successfully organized themselves in political and institutional ways both 
at local (Kurdistan) and national (Iraq) levels. Iraqi Kurds are basically tented to use Iraqi 
identity and their power position within Iraqi state as means to defend themselves from 
Iraq’s Arab nationalists and Turkish and Iranian aggression. Since the fall of Saddam 
regime and establishment of Kurdistan autonomy, it is widely acknowledged that almost 
all hundred per cent of Kurdish society is supporting Kurdish independence from Iraq 
and ready to advocate such a declaration of independence by Kurdish regional 
government.8 But international circumstances and regional forces will never tolerate such 
Kurdish demands at today’s Middle East, apparently. The president of Kurdistan region, 
Massoud Barzani, has several times said that ‘as a nation, Kurds have the right to 
federalism, but also to independence. Because of current realities and conditions, 
independence has not been on the agenda yet.’9-10 For all of these above-mentioned 
political and social reasons, it is in the Kurds’ interests to be part of democratic federal 
but also a strong Iraq that can defend their borders and protect them from foreign Iranian 
and Turkish threats. Therefore the Kurdish foreign policy choices do not converge with 
Shia community and their Iran-backed political societal leaders and political parties.   
 
The Iraqi Kurdish leadership has been trying to build strategic (independently of Iraqi 
Arabs) relations with the U.S. which is actually having strong military presence in Iraq. 
The Kurdish Government has asked the U.S. which has helped develop oil infrastructure, 
to retain up to fifty thousand American soldiers in the Kurdish region, including Kirkuk 
city.11 In November of 2008, the president of Kurdish region said that the U.S. military 
can have bases in Kurdistan if American administration and Iraqi central government fail 
to sign a security agreement, and he said his administration would “welcome” such 
move.12 The Kurdish leaders have been on several occasions declaring that they would 
welcome the U.S. army to set up military bases in Kurdistan region since the fall of 
former regime.13 The Kurds try to guarantee their security questions basically by 
enhancing their own political, military and economic capabilities at local and national 
levels and by developing strong strategic and military relations with the U.S. at national 
and regional contexts. For the Kurds, the most critical external actor that can influence 
                                                  
8 See ‘High Expectations of Independence: For Many Kurds in Iraqi North, Autonomy Is Just a Means to 
an End’ in Washington Post, by Ellen Knickmeyer 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/07/31/AR2005073101055.html  
9 See, ‘Kurdistan: Barzani claims independence for Kurdistan’ in The Unrepresented Nations and Peoples 
Organization (UNPO) http://www.unpo.org/content/view/465/236/  
10See also, ‘A Talk with Kurdish President, Massoud Barzani (Interview by Ma'ad Fayad in Arbil in 
01/09/2008) ’ at Asharq Al-Awsat: The leading Arabic international paper 
http://www.aawsat.com/english/news.asp?section=3&id=13920  
11 Source: ‘Kurds want U.S. forces to remain in northern Iraq’ in World Tribune  (29 April 2009) 
http://www.worldtribune.com/worldtribune/WTARC/2009/ss_iraq0341_04_29.asp  
12 ‘Kurdish leader welcomes US bases in north Iraq’ in Al Arabiya News Channel  (02 November 2008) 
http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2008/11/02/59358.html  
13 ‘Barzani: Kurdistan will allow US bases’ in Press TV in 02 November 2008 
http://www.presstv.ir/detail.aspx?id=74103&sectionid=351020201   
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them positively and/or negatively is the USA. American forces in Iraq are apparently the 
only potential friend that the Kurds can rely on for self-defense in the case of possible 
attacks from Iraqi Arabs, Iran or Turkey. Almost all of foreign relations of Kurds are 
strategically based on the preservation of the achievements they have already made in 
new Iraq. 
 
4.3 The Sunni Arabs 
 
With Saddam’s fall in 2003, the Sunni Arabs’ political domination has completely ended. 
The U.S.-led coalition administration’s de-baathification program removed most of 
Sunnis from governmental and bureaucratic positions (Gritten 2006). The Sunni ruling 
elite have been replaced by the elected Shias who are actually representing the majority 
of Iraqi citizens (ibid). Consequently, Sunni Arabs’ resentment toward the new 
appointments increased. Having felt increasingly marginalized, they began to boycott the 
elections and support insurgents fighting the coalition forces in Iraq (ibid). Most of 
secular and radical nationalist and Ba’athist Sunni Arabs have formed illegal armed 
groups to attack on the U.S.-led coalition forces but also fighting extremist Shia militias 
and Iraqi security forces. Radical Sunni Islamists, on the other hand, have allied with al-
Qaeda networks against the U.S. and new Iraqi security forces and Shia militias. A 
survey that was carried out in February-March 2007 has found that over 50 percent of the 
Iraqis were approving of the attacks on the U.S. troops (MSNBC World News, 19 March 
2007). The same poll was indicating that more than 90 percent of Sunni-Arabs were 
approving of the attacks on Americans (ibid).  
 
By 2007, the drive toward consolidation of power and influence by predominant 
insurgent groups has brought about critical internal friction and has indicated that the 
Sunni insurgents fighting the American and Iraqi forces are no longer a massive and 
uniform threat (Kohlmann 2007:30). In reality, insurgent groups were often considerably 
different from each other in terms of their structures, ideologies and political aims. For 
instance, cooperation between al-Qaeda groups and other Sunni insurgents in Iraq have 
come to an end because of al-Qaeda’s ‘use of suicide bombings and foreign fighters’ 
(ibid). Although main elements of al-Qaeda in Iraq have been attacking Shia political and 
religious targets, Islam al-Ansar (a radical Sunni group having strong ties to al-Qaeda) 
have been backed by Iran for their activities in Kurdistan region, the U.S. officials 
claimed (BBC News, 15 Aug 2006). Since 2003, ‘Syrian intelligence was widely 
reckoned to have quietly aided the flow of foreign jihadists to Iraq [and] as many as 80% 
of the foreign fighters who entered Iraq's maelstrom passed through Syria’ (The 
Economist, 04 Oct 2008). Thanks to unpopularity of radical Islamic groups amongst the 
majority of Iraqi Kurds, the Kurdish security forces have successfully defeated this group 
from the mountainous areas of Kurdistan-Iran border regions. Apart from Syria’s 
logistical support to all sorts of Sunni insurgency and Iran’s covert and strategic support 
to Islam al-Ansar, no neighboring state have aided al-Qaeda networks. Foreign Arab 
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fighters (among them many Palestinian refugees) have joined al-Qaeda groups from 
Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, and Syria (Debat 2004). In 2007 American army officials 
in Iraq argued that ‘about 45 percent of all foreign militants targeting U.S. forces and 
Shia civilians and Iraqi security forces are from Saudi Arabia; 15 percent are from Syria 
and Lebanon; and 10 percent are from North Africa’ (Parker 2007). However, as of 
today, Al-Qaeda seems to be not welcomed but hated by most of Sunni Arab 
communities because of their role in sectarian killings and bombing of Shia civilian 
targets. Today Sunni tribal leaders and secular Sunni groups are leading their 
communities to join and participate in state’s decision-making mechanisms and cooperate 
with the coalition forces to defeat foreign terrorist networks from predominantly Sunni 
Arab areas. 
 
Unlike at previous electoral processes, Sunni Arabs have participated in provincial 
elections held by 31st January of 2009. Through provincial elections of 2009, Sunni 
Arabs took the local administrative control of Iraq’s second biggest province, Nineveh 
(through nearly 50 percent of votes), and Salahaddin for the first time since the regime-
change (Robertson 2009). ‘Sunni [Arab] parties will control [city] councils in the central 
and western provinces of Diyala, Anbar, Salahaddin and Nineveh. They will also have a 
stronger presence in mixed majority-Shia governorates such as Baghdad’ (Institute for 
War and Peace Reporting, 27 February 2009).The results of local elections indicate that 
Sunnis did regain political power in other corners of Iraq (BBC News, 06 Feb 2009). For 
example, in Anbar province, only 2 percent of voters had participated to national 
elections in 2005 due to Sunni-boycott, whereas 40 percent of voters cast ballots at 
provincial elections on 31st January of 2009.14 ‘Anbar province will be governed by a 
tribal coalition led by leaders of the Awakening Council, US-backed armed Sunni groups 
that have helped quell extremists’ (ibid). The return of Sunni Arabs to Iraqi politics has 
not only weakened the Kurdish authorities at local levels but it also weakened their 
positioning vis-à-vis Iraqi central government at national, regional and international 
contexts. 
 
In 2005 the U.S. forces started to help Sunni tribal leaders, particularly in Anbar province 
but also in other provinces, to build ‘Awakening Councils’ which established legal armed 
militias for fighting against al-Qaeda and other radical Sunni groups (The Economist, 04 
April 2009). In the past, most members of the Awakening Councils were fighting against 
the U.S.-led coalition forces but they joined the Iraqi forces fighting al-Qaeda groups in 
return for monthly salaries (BBC News 03 May 2009). As mentioned above, Iraqi Sunnis 
are deeply fragmented in radical conflicting political and ideological lines. Some Sunni 
sections’ recent rapprochement to Shia-led government and the coalition forces may help 
them to join the country’s political institutions gradually, but this will not contribute to 
their illegal external relations with countries like Syria. We should also keep in mind that 
                                                  
14 Source: The Wall Street Journal, ‘Iraq's Election Results Bolster Maliki's Party’ by Gina Chon (06 Feb 
2009) http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123384434642052339.html  
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Sunni groups’ (including former Ba’athists and Al-Qaeda networks) relations with Sunni 
Arab World were built on international legal and legitimate channels. Those relations 
were underground and illegal in their nature. This implies that Sunni Arabs will remain 
the least influential societal group on the State’s foreign policy making mechanisms in 
near future. However in foreign politics they are basically lobbying Sunni Arab countries 
to counterbalance the Shia domination and Iran’s growing influence in Iraq. They have 
also supported Turkey and Syria’s anti-Kurdish autonomy policies fiercely but they could 
not have translated their diplomatic efforts into concrete effective actions due to their 
weak power position in Iraqi state institutions until now.  
 
4.4 Kirkuk issue and other territorial disputes  
 
Kirkuk issue does lie at the core of territorial disputes between the Kurdistan Regional 
Government (KRG) and the central government in Baghdad because ‘Kirkuk is the center 
of the Iraqi petroleum industry and thus strategically and economically important to the 
Iraqi state’ (Global Security 2009). For the Kurds of Kirkuk and the KRG, the inclusion 
of Kirkuk is about far more than just the city’s very rich oil reserves. The Kurds argue 
that Kirkuk is symbolizing Kurdish struggle for autonomy, and it is Kurdish 
geographically, histororically and demographically. The Kurdish authorities say they can 
be reconciled with the Arab majority (both Sunni and Shia) only when Saddam regime’s 
‘Arabization’ policy (the settlement of tens of thousands of Sunni Arabs in Kirkuk and 
displacement of thousands of Kurds during his thirty years dictatorial rule) is changed to 
the contrary. “Article 140 of Iraq's new constitution provides for several things: the return 
of Arab "settlers" and a redrawing of the boundaries of Kirkuk province, surrounding the 
city; a census; and … a referendum on whether Kirkuk should join the present Kurdistan 
federal region.… [However] the referendum’s exact terms have yet to be drafted. Among 
other things, the Kurds want to adjust the borders of Kirkuk province to bring back four 
Kurdish-populated towns (Chamchamal, Kalar, Tuz Kermatu and Kifri) which Saddam 
had put into other provinces to shift Kirkuk's demographic balance against the Kurds” 
(The Economist, 07 Apr 2007). According to the Article 140, referendums shall also be 
held in some other Kurdish towns remain outside Kurdish region such as Shengal, 
Makhmur, and another oil-rich Kurdish city, Khanaqin. Today Federal borders of 
Kurdish region cover Iraq’s three provinces in the north (Duhok, Arbil and Sulaymani) 
according to the Iraq’s new constitution. Nevertheless in reality Iraqi Kurdistan region, 
which the Kurds assert and KRG’s personnel control at local admisnisrative terms, is 
covering certain parts of following provinces: Nineveh, Saladin, Kirkuk and Diyala (The 
Economist, 19 Apr 2008). Turkey, Iran, Syria, and major Iraqi Arab groups (both Shia 
and Sunni) believe that inclusion of Kirkuk into Kurdistan will foster the economic base 
for a future declaration of an independent Kurdish state, which may attackt their 
persecuted Kurdish populations to break away (Mardini 2009). 
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Up to now, the Kurds’ close collaboration and friendly relations with the U.S. has 
appeared one-sided. The KRG’s Prime Minister says that “when we say something about 
protecting our people's rights, they [Americans] see it as a problem that disrupts their Iraq 
policy” (The Economist, 21 Feb 2009). The Kurdish-Arab tension may boil over again. 
While many diplomatic observers think that the U.S. should let the United Nations and 
the European Union involve in the issue and bring an agreement between parties, the 
Kurdish side wants Obama administration to nominate a special-envoy to handle this 
question, however the new U.S. adminisration have not showed any signal of doing so 
yet (The Economist, 21 Feb 2009). When, in 2008, Iraqi army units entered into 
Khanaqin city without asking for the consent of Kurdish authorities, the tension between 
the central government and the Kurds reached its highest level. As the soldiers of Federal 
Kurdistan have remained deployed around Khanaqin, Mulla Bakhtiyar (Kurdistan 
President Barzani’s Khanaqin representative and a leading figure of Patriotic Union of 
Kurdistan) told the media in Kifri that “the position of the Kurdish political leadership is 
very clear; we defend our land, never attack, and always prefer peace” (The Kurdish 
Globe 2008:3). Bakhtiyar did also add that “Kurdish negotiators in Baghdad have opened 
99 gates for dialogue and one gate for war. If they [the Iraqi government] choose the gate 
to war, they have been told that if war happens in Khanaqin it will happen in Kirkuk, 
Mosul, and the other disputed areas” (ibid). 
 
Kurdish leadership recently declared that they will fully respect the constitutional acts 
and articles referring to distribution of the oil reserves among all Iraqis equally, however 
they also add that “Kirkuk together with its oil reserves, is part of Kurdistan” in terms of 
historical, geographical and historical facts (PNA, 30 May 2009). As mentioned above, the 
article 140 of Iraq’s new constitution requires a referendum on the status of Kirkuk, but 
referendum has been held yet because pre-referendum requirements (security, census and return 
of exiled Kurds) have not been fulfilled up to now. The U.S. shows careful forethought 
about Kurdish demands over Kirkuk because it fears that any strong confrontation 
between the groups can cause inter-group conflicts which can damage the Iraq’s integrality. 
It should be noted that ‘control of Kirkuk and the distribution of oil revenues’ in the Kurdish 
region are still the most quarreled issues between the Kurdish regional government and the 
central Iraqi government (ibid). Any unilateral move aiming to control those controversial 
territories is likely to end with an internal war between the Kurds and Arabs. On 28th of June of 
2009, the Kurdish security forces loyal to Kurdistan regional administration saw an Arab-led Iraqi 
army unit approaching Makhmur, a predominantly Kurdish city in Kurdistan but remains outside 
official borders of Federal Kurdish region. According to Washington Post news report, ‘Kurds 
believed the unit was trying to enter the town, and for 24 hours, Kurdish leaders, Iraqi officials in 
Baghdad and the U.S. military negotiated until the Arab-led Iraqi unit was diverted.’15 The U.S. 
military is actually trying to by-pass such potentially quite dangerous moves by 
bolstering its presence in Kirkuk after the confrontation in Khanaqin. 
                                                  
15 Kurdish Leaders Warn Of Strains With Maliki, in The Washington Post (July 17, 2009) 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/07/16/AR2009071604369.html  
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5. Constraints on the Groups’ foreign policy 
choices and behaviors  
 
 
 
 
 
5.1 Limits of the Groups’ behaviors: Common interests at 
national context  
 
We may not be able to explain in the right manner why the leaders of Iraq’s major 
societal groups needed to act according to Iraq’s national interests, if we do not take 
carefully into account the internal circumstances forcing them to do so. For instance, the 
Kurds’ external relations are based on a defensive strategy. The new status-quo balancing 
Iraq’s political system has provided great benefits to them. They have their self-ruled 
autonomous region, the power of which is clearly defined in the Iraq’s new democratic 
constitution. The Kurdish political leaders gained critical positions in the government and 
the state’s crucially important bureaucratic bodies. The Kurdish elites’ strong presence in 
Baghdad makes it harder for their external enemies (Syria, Turkey and Iran) to go 
openly/directly into cooperation with the Shia-dominated government against the Kurdish 
interests. It is likely to say that defending current status-quo and preserving the political 
achievements made against any external threat is in the interests of Iraqi Kurds. Put 
differently, defending Iraq’s new constitution, its federal political system and the security 
of its borders from foreign aggressors are in the interests of KRG and Kurdish leaders 
serving as Iraq’s FPE. It is because without the current balance of power and new status-
quo, the Kurds could not defend themselves from their internal rivals (Shia majority and 
Sunni Arabs insurgents) and external Turkish and Iranian threats. For the Kurds, it is vital 
for them to preserve their regional autonomy within Iraqi state, backed by the coalition 
forces. If the Kurdish region would not be a part of federal Iraq, the Kurdistan 
administration could have been attacked by Turkey, Iran and Syria. The shelling and air-
strikes by Turkish and Iranian armies on the Kurdish border regions inside Iraq since 
2006 does vindicate such kind of assertions. 
 
Defending the Iraq’s borders and struggling for the country’s national economic and 
political interests have been in the interests of other Iraq’s two major communities too. 
For instance, the Shia alliance needed to keep the country’s integrity and preventing it 
from dissolving into three parts because their overwhelming demographic majority 
assured their political domination at Iraqi parliament and other state institutions. A 
legitimate Shia-led political rule in Baghdad could not have only deterred Sunni Arabs’ 
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claims for more political power at state’s structures but it have also balanced or blocked 
increasing Kurdish demands for more autonomy in the North.  
 
Sunni Arab communities and their organized political parties, from the beginning, were 
against the creation of a loose federal system because all important rich oil-reserves lie at 
the North and South of the country whose inhabitants are predominantly Kurdish in the 
north and Shia in the South. Sunni Arabs’ illegal sections have finally realized that 
fighting against the Shia-dominated government will only marginalize/weaken 
themselves vis-à-vis Shia and Kurdish at all governmental levels. Their current 
participation into electoral processes gave them certain political power at local levels 
(provincial councils). Cooperation with secular Shia Maliki government against al-Qaeda 
networks has strengthened their position in military affairs as well. They realized that 
they can protect themselves via legitimate military mechanisms much better against 
extremist Shia militias and al-Qaeda’s foreign fighters. All these recent developments 
encouraged them to not ally with external threats to Iraq such as global Al-Qaeda 
networks and Syria’s destabilizing efforts and radical pan-Arabic and Islamic (anti-
American) nationalists. Their current inclusion into Iraqi political and military 
establishments indicate that they have fired the some ideological bridges connecting them 
to the enemies of Iraqi State abroad, namely radical international fundamentalist groups 
and the remains of Saddam’s Ba’ath party. The Sunni communities’ integration to 
national political mechanisms will help them to resist more efficiently the Kurds’ 
territorial claims in Mosul and Kirkuk provinces as well.  
 
One may not need repeatedly to point to Shias’ interest in the preservation of current 
political status-quo in Iraq, because they have been the biggest beneficiaries of the Iraq’s 
new democratic political system. Some may doubt about their relations with Iran. Shias’ 
relations with Iran have been selective and limited in many ways because of the U.S. 
military presence in Iraq. The growth of secular wing in Shia politics under the leadership 
of Maliki shows that strong political connections are weakening with Iran in general at 
Shia front. The Shia militias’ reliance on Iran was basically due to military and 
technological assistance provided by Iranian army for encountering the U.S. and Iraqi 
forces16. By today almost all Shia parties, except some sections of Sadr’s radical 
movement, have normalized their relations with Maliki government, and consequently 
with the U.S. forces in Iraq.  
  
Attempts to secure national borders and opposing to foreign aggressors (foreign terrorist 
networks or bombings of neighboring states like of Iran and Turkey) have become a 
common characteristics of Iraqi parties. This is why not only the U.S. forces but also 
dominant Iraqi political parties (Shia, Sunni and Kurdish) have never approved Turkey’s 
efforts to carry out massive cross-border military operations inside Iraq’s territory against 
                                                  
16 For more information about Iran’s military technological support to Shia militias, see: The Economist, 
‘International: Who makes the bombs?; Iraq’, London: Feb 17, 2007. Vol. 382, Iss. 8516; pg. 58 
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Kurdish guerrillas and Turks’ attempts to involve in Kirkuk issue since 2006, despite a 
lack of agreement among them over these controversial territorial issues.17 18  
 
 
5.2 Regional and International constraints on the Groups’ 
actions and objectives 
 
Syria 
With the approval of President al-Assad, Iraqi Sunni insurgent groups (mostly former 
Ba’athists and including the Revolution Brigades and Ansar al-Sunna) met Syrian capital 
city to establish an opposition alliance to Iraqi government. They announced in 
Damascus in July to form ‘a coalition of seven Sunni Arab insurgent groups with the goal 
of coordinating and intensifying attacks in Iraq to force an American withdrawal’ (Naylor 
2007). Through establishing strong relations with these groups, Syria has been aiming to 
obtain influence in Iraqi politics before the withdrawal of the coalition forces. Iranian 
regime is Syria’s primary friend and a critical supporter of the Shia-led government in 
Iraq, therefore The Iranian pressure makes difficult for Syria support all Sunni groups, 
especially former Iraqi Ba’athists (Naylor 2007). Assad’s Ba’athist regime has apparently 
been supporting former Iraqi Ba’athists (Gerson 2007; Naylor 2007). 
 
On 16th may of 2009 in Damascus, The President of Turkey and The Syrian President al-
Assad re-expressed together their common concern over the criticality of Iraq’s territorial 
integrity for Iraq’s two neighboring countries. Turkey’s President Gul said, “We agree 
with Syria on the necessity of protecting Iraq territorial integrity” (Syria Online, May 
2009). Al-Assad also said that two countries advocate the Iraqi government’s efforts to 
accomplish national reconciliation and keep Iraq’ territorial unity until the withdrawal of 
the U.S.-led coalition forces from the country (ibid). Since the invasion of Iraq, Syrian 
leadership has strongly been underlining the cruciality of Iraq’s territorial integrity and its 
Arab identity for their national and regional security. 19  
 
Turkey 
Turkey’s foreign-policy toward Iraq is built on two essential national interests: 
maintaining that Iraq’s territorial integrity and fighting the Kurdish guerrillas, who have 
military settlements on the mountainous Iraqi-Turkish border region. In Turkey’s view, a 
politically de-centralized Iraq can increase Iranian power in the region and, more 
threateningly, strengthen the Kurdish autonomy in Iraq, thus threatening to encourage the 
Kurds in Turkey (around over 10 millions) for claiming Kurdish cultural and political 
                                                  
17 BBC News, ‘Turkish planes bomb northern Iraq’ (16 December 2007) 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7146567.stm  
18 BBC News, ‘Turkish troops pull out of Iraq’ (29 February 2008) 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7270566.stm  
19 See also, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s speech at Damascus University, November 10, 2005 
http://www.presidentassad.net/SPEECHES/ASSAD%20DAMASCUS%20UNIVERSITY%20SPEECH.htm 
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rights. Because of this, Turkish state is supportive of a stronger Iraqi central government 
vis-à-vis the Kurdish regional government in north of Iraq (ICG-Middle East Report 
No.81, 13 Nov 2008). Turkey has openly been expressing concern over the autonomous 
status of Iraqi Kurds.20 Not only in the case of joint-military operations against Kurdish 
guerrillas, Turkey has also been cooperating with Syria and Iran over the Kurdish issue at 
regional level seriously because Syria and Iran hold similar views and interests with 
Turkey when comes to the political and economic progresses the Kurds have achieved in 
Iraq. As of today, Turkey’s relations with Shia and Sunni parties are based on its anti-
Kurdish strategy. Turkey has been lobbying among the main Shia groups, especially 
Maliki government, to persuade them taking action against Kurdish guerrillas living in 
mountainous regions on Turkish-Iraqi borders. However the critical role of Iraqi Kurds in 
Iraqi politics makes almost impossible for both the U.S. and Maliki government to back 
possible Turkish incursions into northern Iraq.  
 
Sunni Arab countries in the Gulf 
Saudi Arabia, Jordan and other Sunni Arab states fear that an unplanned quick 
withdrawal of the U.S.-led coalition forces can trigger Iranian-backed Shiite militias to 
dominate Iraq, fostering the growth of an Iran-led Middle Eastern alliance which is 
already including radical armed organizations like Palestinian Hamas and Lebanese 
Hezbollah.21 22 Saudi Arabia considers itself as the leader of Sunni Islam and is 
profoundly mistrustful of Iraq’s Shia-dominated Maliki government, which has strong 
Iranian connections. Neither Iraqi Kurds and Sunni Arabs, nor wealthy Sunni Arab 
countries in the Gulf want to see a strong central government in Baghdad. The Kurds and 
Kuwaitis have still fresh memories of sufferings from the hands of Saddam regime and 
the Iran-led Shia nationalism. The Kurdish regional government and Kuwaiti officials 
recently have raised concerns over possible USA sale of thirty six advanced F-16 fighters 
to the central government in Baghdad (The Kurdish Globe, 11 Sep 2008). The role of 
USA here is crucial, as the closest ally of rich Sunni Arab Gulf countries, to understand 
the dynamics of Shia-Sunni competetion over Iraq at regional level. In April of 2008, 
Nuri al-Maliki participated two critical international conferences, one in Bahrain hosted 
the U.S.’s best Arab allies, the other in Kuwait that conveyed all of Iraq’s neighbours and 
also G-8 countries (The Economist, 26 April 2008). Maliki did lobby not only for more 
support from the rich western countries but he also tried to persuade those regional and 
international powers that his government is not with Iranians (ibid). Such kind of formal 
meetings and tenative steps indicate that Maliki government’s main purpose is not to 
broaden Iran’s influnce but assure their rule in Iraqi politics by developing a secular 
political line which is more likely to converge with American interests. Yet, Sunni Arab 
countries are still far away from developing normal friendly relations with Maliki 
                                                  
20 Source: CIA World Fact Book, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/iz.html  
21Source: Robert H. Reid (08 Aug 2007) ‘Arab nations are reluctant to back Iraqi government despite their 
fears of U.S. withdrawal’ in Tucson Citizen. Note: He is correspondent-at-large for The Associated Press 
on Middle East since 1980s. http://www.tucsoncitizen.com/altss/printstory/opinion/59492  
22 Taipei Times, ‘Arab allies reluctant to support Iraq’ (04 Aug 2007) 
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/world/archives/2007/08/04/2003372684  
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government because of the ongoing competition between Iran-led Shia alliance and Sunni 
Arab world at regional level. 
 
The USA 
Tamara Cofman Wittes of the Brookings Institution rightly argues that there are many 
active parties in Iraq’s political reality, and this means that the Americans have a 
restricted power to force them (Associated Press, August 03, 2007). Therefore, she 
argues, what the USA can do is just to establish a domain in which all actors can 
accommodate their demands and reach a nation-wide compromise before its eventual 
withdrawal from the country.23 Especially when comes to the issue of territorial disputes 
between the Kurds and Arabs (both Shia and Sunni), the role displayed by the U.S. is 
highly important. It was basically substantial American military presence that 
discouraged the Turks from invading the northern Iraq. The U.S. presence in Iraq deters 
and frightens the individual communities to pursue maximalist strategies and aims at 
Iraq’s national context and at regional levels. This suffices the neoclassical realist 
argument that international threats to regional powers do emerge from the great powers 
and their influence on regional dynamics (Lobell 2009:48). 
 
Ramzy Mardini24 (2009) of the Jamestown Foundation rightly argues that the threats 
posed to ‘Iraq’s security environment since 2003’ has been very impressively eased in 
2009 because of three developments in Iraq’s domestic politics: (1) establishment of the 
formal Sunni militias by the government to maintain security, (2) ceasefire by Sadr’s 
Mahdi Army, and (3) the U.S.’s new strategy of authorizing and keeping territory against 
insurgencies (ibid). Iraqi government owns those three abomentioned developments to 
the U.S. military operations and their peapproachment to Sunni tribal leaders. As 
mentioned above, mobilization of formal Sunni Baathists and Sunni militias have been 
organized by the U.S. officials, not by Shia government. Maliki has of course drawn 
advantages from the ameliorated situation to strengthen his authority. But, Maliki’s 
efforts have also triggered a new sort of instability, which came out of the overlapping of 
contradicting interests maintained by the country’s two governments: the Kurdish 
regional government and the central Iraqi government (ibid). The U.S. stance is likely to 
be a critical factor determining the fate of Kirkuk issue. It was again the U.S. officials 
who have pursuaded and/or forced the concerned Iraqi groups to let the United Nations 
Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) work on a plan to develop a peaceful solution for 
the Kirkuk question and 14 other territorial disputed areas in northen Iraq.25 
                                                  
23 ‘Arab Opinion Split on Iraq Pullout’ from Associated Press, Amman-Jordan (August 03, 2007) 
http://www.military.com/NewsContent/0,13319,144757,00.html  
24 “Ramzy Mardini is a terrorism analyst writing on security and Middle Eastern affairs for The Jamestown 
Foundation. He was previously Special Assistant on Iranian Studies at the Center for Strategic Studies in 
Amman and a former Iraq Desk Officer for Political Affairs at the U.S. Department of State. He has also 
served within the Executive Office of the President in Washington, D.C.” 
http://www.metimes.com/Opinion/2008/04/24/ramzy_mardiniiraq_strategy_misperceptions/4206/ 
25 Sam Dagher, ‘Can the U.N. avert a Kirkuk border war?’ in The Christian Science: Monitor, (25 April 
2008) available at: http://www.csmonitor.com/2008/0425/p06s02-wome.html  
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6. Why could not Iraq’s major groups’ 
infringing foreign policy choices prevent the 
FPE from taking decisions pursuing the 
national interests? 
 
 
 
 
 
Struggle for political domination in Middle East between Shia (Persian and Arab) and 
Sunni Arab powers have been substantially influencing the shape and characteristics of 
external and inter-group relations of Iraqi Shia and Sunni Arab groups. It is basically 
because Iran but also Sunni Arab countries have been supporting their kin groups in Iraq 
to dominate the country’s political institutions, thus so restricting their regional rivals 
within Iraq for regional dominance. This is exactly what the Shia groups have been doing 
for a long time, though secular Maliki government is partly shifting this conventional 
Shia position in Iraq because of U.S. pressure and Maliki’s pragmatic calculations. 
Essentially two distinct sorts of external constraints, namely from Iran and USA, have 
been imposed on the Iraqi Shias. Iranian ideological impact on Iraqi Shias can be 
explained through Huntington’s (1996) concept of kin-country-rallying, Iran’s leading 
role within Shia Islam and its struggle with Sunni countries over regional domination. 
However, ruling Shia alliance under the leadership of Maliki have recently developed a 
national alliance by cooperating with secular Sunni and Shia groups, in addition to the 
Kurds. This kind of strategy converges with the U.S.’s and UN’s efforts to bring about a 
true reconciliation between Iraqi groups and its anti-terrorism strategy aiming to destroy 
al-Qaeda networks in Iraq. But it could be mistaken to argue that the U.S. is solely 
determining Maliki government’s threat assessment. The U.S. stance regarding Kirkuk 
and other fourteen disputed areas issue in Kurdish region will demonstrate the degree of 
U.S. influence and leverage on the Iraq’s major societal groups.  
 
Security problem occupies considerably a substantial dimension of Iraq’s foreign politics 
within the context of the groups’ political relations with outside world. Syria’s support to 
former Iraqi Ba’athists and other Sunni radical groups could not have sustained their 
struggle against Shia government alone. Sunni Arabs’ return to legal spheres and their 
cooperation with the U.S. and Shia-led Iraqi security forces have substantially weakened 
the Sunni Arabs’ ties with al-Qaeda terrorist networks abroad. In near future Sunni Arab 
countries may begin supporting their kin groups in Iraq. It is likely that disagreements 
over Kirkuk issue may trigger such a rapprochement between Arab countries’ and their 
Iraqi fellows. Recent developments in Iraq show that the Sunnis will remain searching for 
external support.  
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The Kurdish leaders who are serving as Iraq’s FPE at the State’s critical institutions have 
begun to join American-Turkish intelligence sharing cooperation against PKK fighters 
due to increasing pressure from the U.S. administration in Washington. Despite its 
decreasing geo-strategic importance for U.S. military presence in Middle East and 
Europe, Turkey as a regional actor still can draw support from the U.S. government 
against its own Kurdish minority’s cultural and political demands. In late January of 2009 
Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zabari said that they have agreed with Turkey and the 
U.S. to set up a joint command-center in Iraqi Kurdistan for gathering intelligence to 
fight Kurdish PKK guerillas in the border-regions.26 However as we mentioned above, 
Barzani have rejected Turkish government’s pressure demanding joint-military attacks on 
PKK bases in mountainous Turkey-Iraq border regions. And despite substantial 
diplomatic pressure from the U.S. and Turkey, Kurdish President Barzani has several 
times been refusing to define PKK as a terrorist group since 2007 (Romano 2008). 
 
The President of Iraq, Jalal Talabani who is also a Kurdish leader, has dismissed the 
Kurdistan President’s invitation to the U.S. administration for setting up military bases in 
the Iraqi Kurdistan. President Talabani, in an interview made in November 2008, said 
that it is impossible for the American forces to stay in Kurdish region without consent of 
Iraqi central government.27 The impact of objections from Shia and Sunni Arab groups 
needs to be taken into account. For instance, Muqtada al-Sadr’s movement has severely 
criticized Barzani’s offer to the U.S. military and rejected his invitation.28 It is important 
to see the fact that both Talabani and Zabari as Iraq’s FPE members, had to challenge the 
radical choices of Kurdish community’s practical leadership such as Barzani’s offer to 
the U.S. for establishing military bases and his stance towards Turkey regarding PKK 
issue. FPE’s objection to Barzani administration may bear some tactical strategies too, 
but this can not deny the practical changes that have been appearing in Kurdish 
leadership’s position regarding those controversial issues. For example, in late June of 
2009, Kurdish regional parliament has approved a new constitution which defines Kirkuk 
and other predominantly Kurdish areas within Nineveh and Diyala provinces as part of 
Kurdistan region.29 The Kurdish authorities at first said that the constitution will be put 
before Kurdish voters for ratification on the same day that the region holds parliamentary 
and presidential elections but the U.S. Vice President Biden has strongly criticized the 
Kurdish move as “not helpful” to the administration’s goal of reconciling Iraqi major 
societal groups.30 Not only the U.S. administration and Turkey but also Shia’s United 
                                                  
26 Source: Reuters 23 Jauary 2009, Turkey, Iraq, U.S. step up efforts to fight PKK, (Reporting by Zerin 
Elci, writing by Paul de Bendern)  http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSTRE50M4DQ20090123  
27 Source: Al Jazeera News: Middle East, Talabani dismisses US base offer (04 November 2008) 
http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2008/11/200811404636600934.html  
28 ibid. 
29 ‘Iraq Kurds pass new constitution to include Kirkuk’ (AFP 25 June 2009), in The Times of India 
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/World/Middle-East/Iraq-Kurds-pass-new-constitution-to-include-
Kirkuk/articleshow/4699161.cms  
30 ‘Kurds Defy Baghdad, Laying Claim to Land and Oil’ by Sam Dagher in The New York Times 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/10/world/middleeast/10kurds.html  
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Iraqi Alliance and Sunni Accordance Front bloc stressed that they will not recognize the 
constitution drafted and passed by Kurdish parliament.31 Just a few weeks later, on 13th of 
July 2009, Kurdistan Parliament Speaker Adnan al-Mufti told the media that ‘parliament 
has decided to put back the referendum on the regional constitution until a date yet to be 
fixed’.32 Even though the Kurds are well-united in political and organizational terms and 
not divided in their strategic objectives at political party-levels, the above-mentioned 
pressure from international (the U.S.) and regional (Turkey, Syria and Iran) levels have 
apparently constrained the KRG leadership and Kurdish political community’s ability to 
influence Iraq’s FPE (especially the Kurdish societal elites within FPE) according to their 
specific interests in the country’s foreign affairs.       
 
Shia societal elites have, on the other hand, faced a sort of intra-group obstacles 
(domestic constraints). In fact, Shia community in general and Shia societal elites have 
showed their interests in foreign policy behaviors favoring their close ideological and 
sectarian relations with Iran. However the internal disagreements and severe military 
conflicts between centralists (Dawa party and Sadr’s movement) and federalists (ISCI 
and some small local Shia parties) have prevent the Shias from being more persistent in 
their pro-Iran choices in Iraq’s foreign politics. Maliki’s Dawa party had to develop a 
broader Shia alliance (embracing secular Shia and other Arab groups) to keep the 
government on their hands. Washington also pressured Maliki and his Shia-dominated 
cabinet to not allow Iran’s growing influence on Baghdad, and thus the U.S. officials 
obstructed the growing Tahran’s influence on Shia elites serving as Iraq’s FPE and Iraq’s 
national and foreign affairs. By today, while U.S. is backing Maliki’s FPE, Iranians 
pursue a very different strategy advocating as many Shia factions as possible in order to 
constrain the U.S. and Iraq’s FPE in developing anti-Iranian policies (Visser 2008). In the 
case of Shia society, it is the internal divisions (intra-group level constraints) and 
international (the U.S. basically) constraints the Shia political community and their 
societal elites to force the Shia-dominated FPE for a more pro-Shiaism and Iran in Iraq’s 
foreign policy behaviors.   
 
Sunni Arabs, the situation has always been tougher because they are still facing 
constraints from all levels. Especially the Sunnis’ weak political and social position 
within Iraqi national politics makes it harder for them to influence the Shia and Kurdish 
dominated-FPE. They still can not draw strategic political support from their regional 
kin-countries in governmental terms at regional levels due to their Ba’athist past and ties 
to radical Islamic networks. In sum, the FPE’s foreign threat assessment do differ from 
those of the domestic groups due to multiple internal and external circumstances and 
factors favorable to their autonomous positioning in Iraq’s foreign and security policy 
making independently of the major domestic societal groups’ demands and choices. 
                                                  
31 Source: ‘Iraqi Politicians Concerned By New Kurdish Constitution’, Radio Free Europe: Radio Liberty 
http://www.rferl.org/content/Iraqi_Politicians_Concerned_By_New_Kurdish_Constitution/1767702.html  
32 Iraqi Kurds delay vote on expansionist constitution (13 Jul 2009, AFP), in Yahoo News 
http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20090713/wl_mideast_afp/iraqkurdistanpoliticsconstitution_20090713093745  
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7. Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
 
Iraq’s FPE are composed of the leaders of major societal groups but they have essentially 
acted according to the country’s national interests and for regime’s survival as do 
neoclassical realists expect. However because the state leaders are also influential leading 
figures of their respective societal groups and political communities, they may not be 
willing to act independently of their societal groups, if domestic, regional and 
international constraints do allow them to do so.  
 
Iraq’s domestic societal groups are the major ethic religious groups, therefore they differ 
in terms of their organizational and political characteristics from the domestic societal 
groups exist in western democratic countries such as interests groups, ideological 
political parties or small minority-rights parties. This case shows that the state institutions 
and FPE can enjoy a sort of great political and ideological autonomy from their 
respective societal groups even in socially divided countries with very young political 
democratic institutions such as Iraq. However this does not imply that the domestic 
societal groups’ external relations and their connections with their kin-countries are not 
important or insignificant for other national, regional and international political actors.  
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